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Abstract 
  In the United States, $26-54 billions are spent every year on the marketing of 
pharmaceuticals.
1 This article focuses on the scope and pros and cons of off-label use and 
marketing of pharmaceuticals, and proposes a new FDA regulatory structure to redirect the 
incentives to positives uses of off-label pharmaceutics. The policy concern is to encourage 
research, treatment, and innovation, without allowing pharmaceutical companies to leverage the 
exclusivity that FDA approval brings for unwarranted sales that put patients at risk. The present 
legal regime encourages the FDA and pharmaceutical companies into Prisoner's Dilemma, where 
companies have every reason to attempt to use marketing to end run the agency, and the agency 
has every incentive institutionally to issue regulations which does not effectively address the 
problem. The losers, however, are those afflicted with conditions whose treatment would be 
improved by medications that are presently not indicated for their population, and patients who 
are prescribed medications which have neutral to adverse outcomes. By expanding the tiers of 
labeling to encompass standard of care, experimental, and orphan uses, companies will have 
greater incentive to pursue research which solidly shows that particular products are beneficiary 
treatments for a wider range of target populations.  
 
Introduction 
  In the United States, billions are spent every year on the marketing of pharmaceuticals; 
estimates in 2008 ranged from $26 billion to $54 billion US Dollars. Larger estimates include 
research which is done expressly for marketing purposes, as much as $30 billion dollars, as well 
                                                 
1  Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United State, 5 PLOS Med 29, 29–32 (2008). 
   4   
as the distribution of samples, creation of marketing materials, meeting and talks sponsored for 
marketing, and purchase of advertising.
2 Of this research, the bulk is for marketed 
pharmaceuticals, in what is called Phase IV “seeding” studies, which by design is to promote the 
use of new drug rather than to obtain clinical data.
3 Battles between the Food and Drug 
Administration and pharmaceutical marketers, however, extend into virtually every form of 
marketing, including physician compensation, direct to consumer advertising (DTC) and now 
social media. 
  Since Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,
4 a period of unsettled attempts to 
regulate, clarify, and codify the marketing of pharmaceuticals in the United States has left the 
state of the law confused and treacherous.
5 On one hand, even the industry recognized that many 
of its marketing practices, including junkets to high prescribing physicians and physician 
profiling, were damaging to its own reputation, which is evidenced by the Pharmaceutical 
industries trade association, PhRMA, issuing a series of voluntary codes taken effect January 
2009.
6 On the other hand, courts have been consistent in affirming that the tests outlined in 
Central Hudson are controlling for determining the scope of government’s power in restricting 
the commercial speech associated with FDA regulations.
7 The repeated attempts to introduce 
                                                 
2   Id.  
3   Id. 
4  Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d. 51 (D.D.C. 1998). 
5  See generally the proposals put forward by Joshua A.Weiss, Medical Marketing in the United 
States: A Prescription for Reform. 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., 260, (2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748902 and Mariestela Buhay, Off-label Drug Promotion is Lost in 
Translation: a Prescription for a Public Health Approach to Regulating the Pharmaceutical 
Industry's Right to Market and Sell its Products. 13 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 459 (2010). 
6  PhRMA Code of Interaction with Healthcare Professionals, 
http://www.phrma.org/about/principles-guidelines/code-interactions-healthcare-professionals. 
7  Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 Food & 
Drug L. J. 151 (2008).   5   
FDA control over marketing of pharmaceuticals are at the most contentious when it comes to 
indications which are not part of the FDA approved label. This label details the range of uses 
which have been tested and examined by the FDA, and amount to the reason for granting the 
license to introduce the drug into inter-state commerce. 
  This article focuses on why the present legal regime for labeled drug marketing is ripe for 
change, requiring action from Congress. Presently, the issue tends to be framed in terms of 
commercial speech, which, because of the First Amendment freedom of speech, and federalism 
delegation to state regulation, creates a strong presumption routed in the governing cases in favor 
of companies being able to market any information which is available. Instead, the correct frame 
should be on the quality of information itself, and the overall public interest involved and the 
legal frame should be based on regulation of interstate commerce, which creates both a 
presumption of Federal supremacy, and basic constitutional authority. By creating a labeling 
system which moves the incentive of research away from creating marketing driven information, 
and towards scientific investigation and innovation, the aims and legitimate interests of the 
public can be better served, by moving enforcement from being aimed at regulations centered on 
marketing, to being centered on the license which the FDA grants to engage in interstate 
commerce, and the expectations that companies, doctors, and the public have of that license, it 
moves the legal question from whether companies have the right to speak, publish, or 
disseminate information, and to whether that information advances the public interest as 
embodied in the license. 
  The first part of this article focuses on the scope of off-label use and marketing of 
pharmaceuticals, and outlines the "baby and bath water" problem that policy faces. On one hand,   6   
off-label uses of drugs are broadly useful, and frequently, the standard of care for particular 
illnesses, expanding the public good by increasing treatment options. Many drugs are not tested 
on broad patient populations, such as children. On the other hand, a large fraction of off-label 
prescriptions have little to no provable benefit, sometimes are medically harmful, and cost the 
public when better and less expensive treatments are available. There is ample evidence that 
marketing, rather than research, drives up costs and leads to medications that can endanger the 
public health. The policy concern is to encourage research, treatment, and innovation, without 
allowing pharmaceutical companies to leverage the exclusivity that FDA approval brings for 
unwarranted sales that put patients at risk, and to do so in a manner which will allow interests to 
be fairly treated in the legal system, while surviving legal scrutiny. 
  The second part of this article covers the present law, both in the application of the 
Central Hudson. test, and in the variety of causes of action that have grown up to restrain 
inappropriate off- label marketing, as well as the complexity between labels to actual use. It 
shows that the present legal regime encourages the FDA and pharmaceutical companies into a 
less than optimal Prisoner's Dilemma, where companies have every reason to attempt to use 
marketing to end run the agency, and the agency has every incentive institutionally to issue 
regulations which strike at the leaves and branches of policy problems, without effectively 
getting to the roots of marketing losses. 
  The third part of the article outlines why more calibrated gradation of labeling serves 
policy interests and deals with legal issues most effectively. By expanding the tiers of labeling to 
encompass standard of care, experimental, and orphan uses, companies will have greater 
incentive to pursue research which solidly shows that particular products are safe and effective   7   
treatments for a wider range of target populations. The enforcement of this new regime will be 
backed by sticks, in addition to carrots, with the FDA being able to use a powerful and credible 
set of sanctions against companies that do not adhere to the spirit of the labeling system. 
  The benefits to wider use of pharmaceuticals, in lowering costs, preventing trauma, 
extending and improving life are well understood. The high profile failures of the system have 
shaken public confidence, and created a standing opposition to pharmacuetical industry practices 
which unduly undermines the strength of the system. What is needed is a system which is better 
aligned with the realities of medical practice to preserve the beneficial off-label uses, promote 
R&D incentives to uncover useful clinical information, and reduce promotional behavior that 
poses public health threat and adds unnecessary costs to the healthcare system.  
 
Off Label Marketing Realities 
Marketing of Pharmaceuticals 
  The industry practice of marketing of pharmaceuticals is not well documented in 
scholarly sources, and much of what is written is clearly from the perspective of advocacy for 
professionals, rather than objective descriptions of the institutional structures of marketing, or 
from the public health perspective, which, while it is often less overtly partisan, has a specific 
viewpoint an. provenance as well, in that it seeks to advocate in an adversarial way for the 
interests of patients, or the public interest as being necessarily antagonistic to the industry. 
Internally pharmaceutical centers around access to gatekeepers: the physicians who write scripts, 
the insurance companies who approve payment, and the pharmacists who make 
recommendations to those seeking advice. The allocation of marketing dollars is overwhelmingly   8   
on visits to physicians, and in particular the distribution of samples.
8 
  Earlier in the decade the industry's main players recognized that marketing by incentives, 
which could include all expense paid trips to “conferences” which doubled as vacations, high 
speaking fees, and gifts unrelated to the practice of medicine were both bringing enough negative 
publicity to create moves to regulate the process, and casting doubt on the objectivity of the 
process. The sense in the industry is that such efforts were effectively canceling each other out. 
That is, the strategy of incentive had reached being a Prisoner's Dilemma, and that cooperation 
would be more effective. That there had been several high profile problematic attempts at 
creating a blockbuster through such marketing aided the industry's sense of crisis: Vioxx cast a 
long shadow. The industry's trade group, PhRMA, was the channel to promulgate guidelines on 
marketing, which ended the practice of such perks in marketing. What this means is that the 
increasingly adversarial relationship between how medications were approved, and how they 
were marketed, had produced a series of high profile failures, both on the public and private 
sides, and it had begun to be clear that the interest in unlimited marketing was being under-cut by 
the FDA becoming more conservative in approvals. 
Current Regulatory Scheme 
  Currently, medical marketing is regulated by Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, 
and Communications (DDMAC) as part of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) within the FDA. DDMAC is responsible for ensuring that prescription drug advertising 
and promotions does not out-step the approved label with information that is “false or 
                                                 
8  Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United State, 5 PLOS Med 29, 30 (2008). 
(Table 1)   9   
misleading.”
9 The bulk of DDMAC’s regulatory activities consist of reviewing and providing 
written comments on proposed promotional materials, monitoring promotional activities at 
medical meetings, investigating complaints about alleged violations and initiating enforcement 
actions, usually in the form of warning letters and corrective advertisements.
10 Stronger actions 
against promotional violations due to off-labeling marketing, such as large sum fines, are usually 
handled by the DOJ in form of civil and criminal litigation, though the FDA does have the 
authority to bring criminal sanctions against the CEO of companies that engaged in deviate 
promotional practices, a seldom-used, but powerful, deterrent, which the Agency employed in 
Park brought about by then General Counsel Peter Barton Hutt.
11  
  FDA’s enforcement activity against off-label marketing, predominately through 
DDMAC, lacks specificity, prioritization, and sufficient resources to both monitor the landscape 
and go after the violators. A July 2008 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded that FDA regulation of off-label pharmaceutical promotion has several significant 
regulatory limitations. First, the FDA regulates off-label marketing as part of a broader effort that 
targets many promotional violations, lacking a separate and targeted oversight mechanism. 
Second, the agency is overwhelmed by the volume of promotional materials submitted for 
review and has to prioritize based on the inherent public health threat, which the report 
proceeded to conclude is done is a un-systemic and unscientific manner. The FDA “relies on its 
staff to sort through large volumes of material and select submissions for review... is also 
hampered by the lack of a system that consistently tracks the receipt and review of submitted 
                                                 
9  DDMAC mission on FDA website, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugMa
rketingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm209384.htm#DDMACsMission. 
10   Id. 
11  Park v. United States, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).   10   
materials.”
12 The numbers tell a similar story of strained resources and delayed enforcement. 
FDA took an average of 7 months to issue warning letters, followed by another 4 months for 
corrective action by drug companies with more serious offenses. Between 2003 and 2007, FDA 
referred no violation to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for further enforcement action. 
Meanwhile, the DOJ has pursed litigation that resulted in 11 settlements all identified by sources 
other than the FDA.
13  
  Not only is the institutional structure and the regulatory scheme insufficient, but also 
there is the enforcement loophole that the medical entities with a pharmaceutical company (e.g., 
the departments overseen by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO)) are not subject to the same 
stringent promotional standards as the sales divisions, because CMOs and other medical officers 
are supposedly interfacing with the practice of medicine, of which outside the FDA’s regulatory 
authority both by statute and case law. Because the medical officer is a licensed physician, the 
ethical guidelines reconciles with the long-standing practice of allowing physicians to freely 
prescribe drugs for off-label uses
14 and to influence the prescribing habits of their fellow 
physicians, as in the practice of “Key Opinion Leaders” or KOLs. It is industry common practice 
to leave some of the “gray area” promotional activity to the medical divisions, which handle 
journal reprint distribution and continue medical education. According to an industry source, a 
major pharmaceutical company tasked a portion of its sales force as liaisons between physicians 
and the medical divisions, which then promotes the unapproved uses liberally through journal 
reprints. The medical divisions also actively cultivate “Key Opinion Leaders,” or KOLs, who are 
                                                 
12  GAO, Prescription Drugs: FDA’s Oversight Of The Promotion Of Drugs For Off-Label Uses. 
Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate (July 2008). 
13  Id.  
14  Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of 
Pharmaceuticals, 360 New Eng J Med. 1557, 1557–66 (2009).   11   
allowed to educate other physicians on the off-label uses with little limitation, under the façade 
of practice of medicine. Because FDA is strictly prohibited from regulating the practice of 
medicine, industry end-runs the Agency’s enforcement efforts by using doctors to persuade 
doctors. 
  The policy question of off-label prescribing requires balancing both the benefits and the 
risks of these prescriptions in the practice of medicine. The practice is wide spread: one 
commonly cited estimate is that 21% of all prescriptions are off-label.
15 Federal law explicitly 
authorizes off-label prescriptions for approved drugs,
16 and even compensates tem under 
Medicaid and Medicare.  
  However, not all off-label is created equal. The highly prevalent practice differs greatly 
on its medical justifiability and potential for harm. For example, the American Cancer Society 
found that 80% of all oncologists had written an off-label prescription.
17 Patients facing terminal 
disease have far less to risk than others, and the survey evidence indicates that physicians are far 
more willing to prescribe off-label use.  
  While some off-label use of chemotherapy drugs should be encouraged because the 
innovation outpaces FDA approval and these drugs can be lifesaving for rare cancers, negative 
clinical trials results often demonstrate the lack of benefit or even harm of off-label use.
18 In 
pediatrics, because drugs are generally approved for adult populations and the drug companies 
                                                 
15  David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 Archives 
of Internal Med. 1021, 1025 (2006). 
16  Food and Drug Modernization Act § 214, 21 USC § 396 (1997). 
17  American Cancer Society, What is off-label drug use? 
http://www.cancer.org/Treatment/TreatmentsandSideEffects/TreatmentTypes/Chemotherapy/o
ff-label-drug-use. 
18  Frederic R. Curtiss & Kathleen A. Fairman. Contradictory Actions on Off-Label Use of 
Prescription Drugs? The FDA and CMS Versus the U.S. Justice Department. 15 J. Managed 
Care Pharmacy 161, 163 (2009).    12   
are often reluctant to invest in trials involving pediatric population, except at the end of the 
exclusivity period to gain the six-month extension of market exclusivity giving to pediatric 
indications, there is often no approved drug at all in a particular category. In 1996 one study, 
found that 81% of HIV patients received at least one off-label prescription.
19 Off-label can also 
mean that the route of delivery is not FDA approved, for example taken orally if the medication 
was approved for injection. 
  Alexander T. Tabarrok summarized the prevalence of off-label in a medical practice:
20 “In 
summary, off-label prescribing is common in every field of medicine, and in a large number of 
fields most patients are prescribed at least one drug off-label. It is clear that if the FDA were to 
attempt to prohibit doctors from prescribing off-label, current practices would have to change 
significantly.” He then cites a celebrated example of beneficial off-label use:  
  In 1982, Barry Marshall and Robin Warren discovered in the stomachs of ulcer 
suffers a new bacterium, Helicobacter pylori, which they hypothesized was the 
cause of the ulcer. Their theory was initially highly controversial, but it is now 
believed that most stomach ulcers (perhaps 90 percent or more) are caused by 
Helicobacter Pylori. Using antibiotics such as amoxicillin and tetracycline, these 
ulcers can now be cured. Although hundreds of thousands of prescriptions have 
been written to this effect, all have been off-label. Neither amoxicillin nor 
tetracycline is approved for use in the treatment of stomach ulcers.
21 
 
                                                 
19  Carol L. Brosgart, Off-Label Drug Use in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Disease, 12 J. 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes & Hum. Retrovirology 56, 56 (1996). 
20  Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug Prescribing, 1 
The Independent Rev. 25, 46 (2000).  
21   Id. at 27.   13   
  The risks of off-label use are equally important to consider. According to Hazel Muir 
study, 71% of all off-label prescriptions were useless or harmful.
22 Jacob Rogers in "Freedom of 
Speech and the FDA’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Uses" cites the "fen-phen" prescriptions, 
which caused heart valve damage to 285,000 patients, and Roberts regards this as a conservative 
estimate.
23 In the area of psychiatry and pain management, companies have frequently promoted 
atypical antipsychotics or scheduled painkillers off-label broadly without supporting medical 
evidence of efficacy or safety. “As part of its comparative effectiveness research, AHRQ 
concluded in 2007 that there was ‘insufficient high-grade evidence to reach conclusions about 
the efficacy’ of atypical antipsychotics (e.g., olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone, ziprasidone) for 
off-label uses such as dementia, severe geriatric agitation, depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, autism, Tourette syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders.”
24 
Another example of the anticonvulsant Neurontin (compound name: Gabapentin), originally 
indicated for epilepsy, a limited growth market with relatively small patient population, 
expanded to having as much as 90% of its prescriptions off-label for a wide variety of 
indications,
25 Its journey to a blockbuster is often cited as a successful story within the 
pharmaceutical industry and widely enumerated. In pain management, the severe consequences 
of off-label use of certain strong opioids, such as Actiq and Fentora, have resulted in the FDA to 
consider imposing an Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) program on 
                                                 
22  Hazel Muir, Dicing with Death: There’s a Good Chance that the Pills Your Doctor Prescribed 
Will Do You No Good and Might Even Harm You, New Scientist, 38, 40 (2006). 
23  Jacob Rogers, Freedom of Speech and the FDA’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Uses, 76 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev., 1429, 1433 (2008).  
24  Frederic R. Curtiss & Kathleen A. Fairman. Contradictory Actions on Off-Label Use of 
Prescription Drugs? The FDA and CMS Versus the U.S. Justice Department. 15 J. Managed 
Care Pharmacy 161, 163 (2009). 
25   Jacob Rogers, Freedom of Speech and the FDA’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Uses, 76 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev., 1429, 1433 (2008).   14   
the entire Opioid Class,
26 and the approval of Onsolis, for breakthrough cancer pain, in July 2009 
under REMS.
27 
  Nevertheless, some off-label uses are often supported by medical literature, or by clinical 
practice. FDA can and should encourage the dissemination of information about off-label uses in 
the high-benefit situations, while discouraging and informing physicians and patients when its 
efficacy or safety is in question. However, current regulatory scheme does not afford the FDA 
such a high degree of flexibility. The prescription drug labeling process is, by intent and design, 
narrow and rigorous, and becoming increasing so in the post-Vioxx world. This means that it is 
also expensive and time consuming to get indications approved for the label. Therefore, once a 
drug is on the market, even more so after genericization, there is far less economic incentive to 
pursue widening the label, particularly since the provision of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 mandated that insurance companies and Medicaid reimburse for medically sound off-label 
uses.
28 The ideal policy would work to increase economic incentives to encourage testing and 
collection of information before and during the market exclusivity period before generic entry. 
  One problem in off-labeling marketing is there is clear evidence that pharmaceutical 
companies have attempted to influence medical information at the source. The altering and 
obscuring of data with respect to drugs has a long and tangled history, most notably in the case of 
Vioxx, where it was found that Merck systematically used ghostwriters and guest authorship to 
                                                 
26   American Pain Foundation Endorses Opioid Class REMS Recommendations to FDA: 
Consensus Recommendations, Developed by the Pain Care Forum REMS Task Force (June 
2009), http://www.painfoundation.org/about/position-statements/rems-recommendations.pdf. 
27  FDA Approves Opioid Pain Reliever with Required Risk Reduction Plan, FDA New Release, 
(July 16, 2009), 
  http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm172366.htm. 
28   Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. §1395 (s)(2) (1993).   15   
down play the death rate associated with the medication.
29 Of the 20 papers, 16 were originally 
drafted by a Merck employee or contractor, but were later listed as the work of an independent 
researcher.
30 The JAMA study concluded that Merck had been "less than candid" in its 
disclosures to FDA regarding heart attack risks.
31 The quality of the information stream, not the 
means of delivering it to the doctor's office, is of greater concern. Yet, there has been almost no 
focus from the agency on protecting the quality of the information at the source.  
  Nor is there any evidence that fines imposed by the DOJ, even some over a billion 
dollars, have had significant deterring effect. For example in September of 2009, Pfizer paid a 
total of $2.3 billion US Dollars to settle off-label marketing claims for a drug that had already 
been removed from the market.
32 The fact that such fines have become routine in recent years 
indicates the incentives to broaden the use of a drug by marketing off-label is huge, because of 
the strong motives to create, or protect, a blockbuster drug and high competitive pressure to 
maximize returns on approved drugs before generic entry. According to the 2009 Med Ad Report 
on top prescription medications, the top 500 prescription medications generated $423 billion US 
Dollars in sales, almost half of which came from the US.
33  The cost-benefit analysis falls 
differently from widening of label for a drug to approve for a new indication to one that is 
approved for one delivery route, but not others. The present labeling system does not offer a 
sufficient number of gradations to represent the different levels of risk and probable benefits, in 
                                                 
29  Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to Rofecoxib: Case 
Study, 299 JAMA, 1800, 1800–12, (2008). 
30   Id. 
31   Id.  
32  David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses, Bloomberg 
News (November 9, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4yV1nYxCGoA 
33   Andrew Humphreys & Rebecca Mayer, World's Best-Selling Medicines, Med Ad News 
(2009), available at http://pharmalive.com/magazines/medad/view.cfm?articleID=2129.   16   
essence placing a barrier to entry for indications that are the standard of care, while allowing end 
runs of the agency for prescriptions of dubious medical value, because to expand an indication, 
the license holder must prove a positive benefit, while to persuade physicians to expand 
prescribing, the FDA must prove that it is harmful, or does no good at all. 
  The very fact of physicians and other healthcare professionals relying solely on journal 
studies and anecdotal evidence, often collectively inclusive, points to a policy failure: because of 
the black or white nature of FDA labeling, there is no official government stream of data to 
follow. Evidenced based medicine requires evidence; the lack of data on which prescriptions 
were written for which purposes and their relationship to the current label make it difficult to 
judge the efficacy and dangers of courses of treatment in the target population. 
  In summary, in many cases, the requirements to prove efficacy to third-party payers, 
through prior authorization and other types of managed care are enough for physicians to choose 
effective off-label prescriptions, or at least those which, on balance, are possibly more beneficial 
than harmful. Even a prescription which might have worked is defensible in the case of terminal 
patients or those with highly negative expected outcomes. However, in other cases such as 
Vioxx, the pressure to create a blockbuster drug created incentives to abuse the peer review and 
government reporting systems, leading to a situation where a drug was prescribed well beyond 
the population which it could benefit, and as a result harming patients who stood nothing to gain 
from the particular treatment. 
 
Beneficial Off-label Use: Pediatrics and Oncology 
  It is widely accepted that pediatrics and oncology are two areas of medicine, which have   17   
the most benefit from "off-label" use of medications. For example in the "Off-Label Use of 
Medical Products Position Statement" from the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons: 
In certain patient populations, off-label use of medical products is extensive where 
appropriate therapies are not available. Two of those populations include oncology and 
pediatric patients. Oncology patients depending on the type and severity of the disease 
are frequent recipients of off-label therapies. The FDA has recently recognized the need 
for accelerating the approval of cancer drugs. Pediatric surgeons are likely to use off-
label therapies on neonates, infants, children, and adolescents due to the lack of on-
labeled medical products on the market. Surgeons find a lack of approved pediatric 
devices for many reasons including a historical exclusion of children in medical trials, 
and liability concerns among other issues. In 2007, the Congress recognized significant 
issues with pediatric device development and signed the Pediatric Medical Device Safety 
Act into law as part of the Food and Drug Administration Act Amendments of 2007. 
  
  This recognition is grounded in the nature of the approval process for drugs. According to 
"Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States Outpatient Setting" found: 
Sixty-two percent of outpatient pediatric visits included off-label prescribing. 
Approximately 96% of cardiovascular-renal, 86% of pain, 80% of gastrointestinal, and 
67% of pulmonary and dermatologic medication prescriptions were off-label. Visits by 
children aged <6 years had a higher probability of off-label prescribing (P < .01), 
especially visits by children aged <1 year (74% adjusted probability). Visits to specialists 
also involved a significantly increased probability (68% vs. 59% for general   18   
pediatricians, P < .01) of off-label prescribing.
34 
  
While the exact results of marketing are arguable, such percentages indicate that for pediatric 
care, the off-label drug is not merely a potential option, but for some conditions, the standard of 
care. On one hand, the United States has been considered to be ahead of Europe in expanding 
labeling to increase access to pediatric medications.
35 On the other hand, Europe has a more 
extensive literature of surveying pediatric practice, with many studies even in American Journals 
being compiled from clinical experiences in Germany, the Netherlands, or Europe as a whole. 
The result of more extensive studies can indicate a substantially increased patient risk: 
Recently marketed products also pose safety concerns for children. For example, 
propofol, a sedative-hypnotic, was marketed in 1989 in the U.S. and used for pre-
anesthesia induction. Trial data in children from 1988 showed it had a 9% mortality rate 
in critically ill patients with upper respiratory tract infections compared with 4% for 
standard sedatives, but causality was not established. Since then, propofol's use in 
pediatric intensive care units has been linked with 'propofol infusion syndrome'. This 
syndrome induces hypotension and metabolic acidosis, and produces a propofol 
metabolite that may induce toxicity or predispose patients to sepsis. In the summer of 
2003, the FDA recommended a warning letter be sent to doctors based on adverse event 
reports from MedWatch (the FDA voluntary post-marketing surveillance reporting 
system). This experience illustrates that the original recommendations for dosage and rate 
                                                 
34  Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States Outpatient 
Setting, 9 Acad. Pediatrics, 81, 81 (2009). 
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of administration were not appropriate for all neonates and that the drug's usage in 
clinical trials could not be generalized to longer exposures or more rapid rates of titration 
in neonates treated in the community.
36 
  
  Clearly, the 6 month exclusivity period for a pediatric indication and trials requirement 
are addressing a very real problem that of not having rigorous clinical data on which to make 
evidence based decisions. However, data such as these shows that on one hand, it is virtually a 
necessity to prescribe off-label for broad classes of condition in pediatrics. On the other hand, the 
consequences of incorrect dosage in children can result in fatalities. None of this suggests any 
wrong doing on the part of any of the parties involved in the case of propofol, or in other similar 
specific cases outlined. The problem is purely one of information. 
  The possibility that marketing could be driving misuse of medications has been brought 
up in the case of Prilosec in infants. Prilosec is an anti-acid drug prescribed for adults with acid-
reflux. However, in children, it is not acid that causes the majority of spit ups, according to 
Gremase in "GERD in the Pediatric Patient: Management Considerations": 
These results suggest that in some individuals, GERD [Gastroesophageal reflux disease] 
is a lifelong disease that may require aggressive therapy early in life to reduce the risk of 
long-term sequelae, such as erosive esophagitis or Barrett's esophagus. Therefore, 
because GERD is common, it is important to distinguish pediatric patients with 
pathologic reflux that may lead to complications of GERD from those with physiologic 
GERD who have a better prognosis. The presence of associated symptoms such as poor 
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24 (2008).   20   
weight gain, excessive crying, disturbed sleep, and feeding or respiratory problems 
distinguishes infants with GERD from those with physiologic gastroesophageal reflux.
37 
  
While there is a population that needs intervention, most do not. According to Schwarz et al.:
38 
 
Although minor degrees of gastroesophageal reflux are noted in both children and adults, 
the degree and severity of reflux episodes are increased during infancy. Thus, 
gastroesophageal reflux represents a common physiological phenomenon in the first year 
of life. As many as 60-70% of infants experience emesis during at least one feeding per 
24-hour period by age 3-4 months. The distinction between this "physiologic" 
gastroesophageal reflux and "pathologic" gastroesophageal reflux in infancy and 
childhood is determined, not merely by the number and severity of reflux episodes (when 
assessed by intraesophageal pH monitoring), but is most importantly determined by the 
presence of reflux-related complications, including failure to thrive, erosive esophagitis, 
esophageal stricture formation, and chronic respiratory disease. 
  
  To summarize: reflux, or spitting up or vomiting, is common in infants, while for some 
children it is the sign of the onset of a long-term condition, where acid and problems with GI 
function are the beginning of a long term pathology. However for the majority of children, it is 
not serious. Because of this, the standard of care from medical literature has been stable for 
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sometime, suppressing the acid is far less important in children than dealing with the muscle 
problem, and conservative therapy should be used.
39 The same warning is repeated in 2004.
40 
              However against these repeated warnings that GERD requires observation, that there are 
evidence based guidelines from the American Academy of Pediatrics
41 what has been observed 
in a clinical setting is the reverse:
42 
Only 8 of 44 pH studies showed abnormal acid reflux. Forty-two of these 44 infants were 
already on antireflux medications. Other etiologies included hyper- trophic pyloric 
stenosis (4) and renal tubular acidosis (1). Discontinuation of medication did not result in 
worsening of symptoms in most infants with normal pH studies.  
 
  To summarize, less than 20% of the infants on anti-reflux medications met the clinical 
guidelines. However, when the medications were withdrawn, 6 of the 36 infants worsened in 
condition. This is not to draw cause and effect, but to show that even in the population that does 
not meet the current standard of care, medications—and all of these prescriptions were either 
OTC or off-label— may be of some benefit. The challenge is to produce a labeling system that 
will promote, not “the standard of care” but to promote the good of the patients. 
  GERD is merely one of thousands of conditions treated by hundreds of compounds in 
millions of pediatric care visits. From the forgoing it can be seen that simple Manichean 
divisions of "off-label" being good or bad are not supported by the peer reviewed evidence. Even 
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when the standard of care does not recommend medication, sometimes it can be effective, but 
often it is harmful. There are no clear indications from the FDA, or from the compendia that 
physicians rely upon. Even where such guidelines exist, as they do in the case of GERD, they are 
routinely ignored, or not followed. The present labeling regime does not advance the public good 
or the benefit of a large population in the cases outlined. When virtually all medications in a 
target population are used off-label, then clearly there has been both market failure and 
regulatory failure. In a large number of identifiable populations it does not provide enough 
information for physicians, and is not available in a manner which allows for evidence based 
diagnosis in a clinical setting. The lack of granularity of information hinders good decisions from 
patients, doctors, industry participants, and regulators.  
  Since, in the end, the costs of these problems are born by the government, and the public 
in the form of health care and insurance costs, it is incumbent on the FDA, as the agency charged 
with protecting the public good in this area, and the Congress, charged with legislating where it 
is “necessary and proper,” to act on the evidence of regulatory failure which is pervasive in 
almost every area of medical practice. Since the particular areas where over-prescribing: pain 
management and psycho-actives, touch on every area of medical practice, and the areas where 
labeling is a hindrance: terminal patients are those of extreme urgency to the afflicted patients 
and their families, this is not a marginal defect in the law and its application. 
 
Problems with the Current Legal Regime 
  The present legal regime of drug marketing faces a series of legal problems that make the 
already outlined policy problem more difficult. The first is the well understood First Amendment   23   
problem and the repeated failure for both the Agency, and Congress, to draft regulations which 
can withstand the Central Hudson Test for the permissibility of government restraint on 
commercial speech. The second is the failure of mechanisms such as misbranding suits and the 
Fraudulent Claims Act based system to restrain off-label marketing abuses, and the defects with 
reliance on qui tam suits in the case of drug marketing. The third is the proliferation of 
jurisdictions that the first two problems have in no small part created. These three problems with 
the present legal regime argue for a more thorough revision of the means by which drug 
marketing is integrated into advancement of legitimate interest of the public.  
  In the final section of the paper, reasons for this dramatic drop in approvals will be 
explained in terms of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and solutions for a legislative process less prone to 
such a disconnect between stated goals and results will be sketched. The first is the failure of its 
drug marketing provisions to pass basic First Amendment tests, codified by the Supreme Court in 
what is known as the Central Hudson Test. The second is the failure of qui tam suits to be an 
adequate secondary mechanism in schemes to promote off-label marketing as an end run around 
the approval process, and the third is the welt of jurisdictions that a restraint and law suit based 
approach to enforcement has resulted in. 
 
Central Hudson and Prior Restraint Failures 
  Before the FDAMA, Congress attempted to curb abuses in reselling of drugs with the 
Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987. It specifically forbade reselling of free samples, 
required distribution of samples only under regulated conditions, and permitted only   24   
manufacturers the right to re-import their own drugs, except in emergencies.
43 Overall the 
PDMA, while effective in ending the particular abuses it was targeted to restrain, did not serve as 
a broad mandate for the agency to regulate or restrict marketing activities. The PDMA, however, 
has not been seriously challenged because it rests squarely on the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
and the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the introduction of goods into interstate 
commerce. 
  The attempts in the FDAMA and subsequent to regulate speech, as opposed to 
distribution, however, are not as firmly founded constitutionally. It is not that the FDAMA 
regime is universally anti-marketing, on the contrary, Direct to Consumer (DTC) marketing was 
allowed and expanded, but it is that attempts to create very narrow regulations on the manner of 
marketing unapproved, but potentially beneficial, practices failed to meet Central Hudson Test.  
  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
44 Powell's 
opinion created a four part standard for government banning of commercial speech: 
1.  Is the speech protected? That is it must be lawful, and not be fraudulent or misleading? 
2.  Does the government assert a "substantial" interest? 
3.  Does the regulation "directly" advance the government interest asserted? 
4.  Is the regulation the least intrusive way of advancing the government's asserted interest? 
 
  This four part test creates three hurdles for government regulation of speech. The court is 
allowed to judge the motivation of the government action, its efficiency in performing advancing 
the interest, and means by which it does so, including alternative means. There is little evidence 
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that this standard is due to be relaxed, in fact, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 
45 showed 
that the court believed that regulations on advertising were suspect even before Central Hudson, 
by citing the older Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where 
a state blanket ban on advertising prices was overturned.
46 The court affirmed that while the 
fourth part does not need to be perfect, it must be "reasonable," that is reasonably close to the 
least intrusive way of achieving a substantial interest directly. In 44 Liquormart, the court 
approvingly quoted Brandeis' famous dictum from Whitney v California: "the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression."
47 
  Therefore, it is not difficult to see why in two separate cases, courts overturned the 
FDAMA on this exact point. The first time was in Washington Legal Foundation v Friedman,
48 
and then again in Western States Medical Center v Henney.
49 In the first case off-label marketing 
restrictions were overturned, and in the second the restrictions on pharmacists marketing 
particular compounded drugs without needing to go through a separate FDA approval was struck 
down
. Despite this background the agency continues to issue guidelines and make statements 
which seem to hinge on submission and pre-approval of marketing materials.  
 
False Claims Act 
The Federal False Claims Act (FCA) 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 imposes triple damage 
liability on a party who knowingly submits false records to the federal government in hopes of 
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payment, such as Medicare/Medicaid receipts.
50 Originally passed in 1863, the FCA was spurred 
by cases of fraudulent goods sold to the Union war effort, including suits qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which translates to “who pursues this action on our 
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own,” or “qui tam” for short.
51 
The qui tam cause of action allows a private plaintiff, who knows of a fraud against the 
government, to initiate a lawsuit on behalf of the government, in return for a share of the 
proceedings if successful.
52 In the context of off-labeling marketing, whistleblowers help the 
United States government seek recovery for claims paid by government health programs 
resulting from these unapproved marketing practices. In turn, the private plaintiffs, known as 
"relators," are entitled to 15% to 30% of the government’s recovery, plus legal fees and other 
related costs.
53  Companies can be, and have been, sued both by the government and by qui tam 
whistleblowers.
54 
The FCA creates a tension between the ability of the law to generate “private Attorneys 
Generals” to assist the government in preventing fraud with their insider knowledge and the 
creation of suits regarded as opportunistic, trying to reap rewards over false accusations or 
without providing information that is helpful for the prosecution.
55  As a matter of fact, Congress 
has amended the act several times to “walk a fine line between encouraging whistle-blowing and 
discouraging opportunistic behavior,” which resulted in a series of subject matter jurisdictional 
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bars that relators must satisfy in order to bring qui tam cases in federal court.
56  
The FCA has been used as one of the primary weapons in enforcing drug marketing 
regulations, especially in recent years, as evidenced by the large DOJ settlements.
57 Since the 
federal government doesn’t regulate the practice of medicine and leaves the use of drugs to the 
judgment of physicians (state law regulates the practice of medicine through medical licensure 
and malpractice tort law), the Federal Government specifically contemplates off-label use of 
FDA-approved drugs and compensates physicians for off-label prescriptions. Therefore, it is 
legal for a company to submit claims to federal healthcare programs that have not been FDA-
approved. However, it is illegal for a pharmaceutical company to engage in organized marketing 
of off-label claims that persuade physicians to write prescriptions for off-label uses.
58 
Government programs generally will cover drugs only if their use is “reasonable and necessary” 
in a “safe and effective” manner, as determined by FDA approval or citation in medical 
compendia. The submission of a claim otherwise is a false claim, and if it is due to off-label 
marketing, the pharmaceutical company is considered to have provided causation, by kicking off 
the chain of events that led to the submission of the false claims to the government. The FCA is 
more commonly used, however, by whistle-blowers with insider information, who are often 
employed by the pharmaceutical industry, directly against hospitals and doctors, engaging in 
more prosaic billing schemes for services not rendered, or drugs not actually dispensed.  
The FCA has been applied to Medicare and Medicaid billing with the Deficit Reduction 
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Act of 2005 ( DRA),
59 including the attempt to submit billings for off-label marketing which 
falls outside of permitted FDA regulations. However, high profile cases, including Pfizer's Bextra 
which concluded with $2.3 billion settlement with DOJ, and Eli Lilly's Zyprexa for $1.415 
billion, were not qui tam suits.
60 Because relators must not only know of the scheme to engage in 
off-label marketing, but must have personal knowledge of payments, or show that false claims 
were paid, their ability to successfully make a claim in complex off-label marketing schemes is 
limited, as shown by the 2009 11
th Circuit decision of Hopper v. Solvay:
61 
We will assume arguendo that when a physician writes an off-label prescription  
with knowledge or intent that the cost of filling that prescription will be borne by the 
federal government, and when a claim is ultimately submitted to the federal  
government to pay for that prescription, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) may have been  
violated....Nonetheless, the relators’ Complaint does not identify a single physician who 
wrote a prescription with such knowledge, does not identify a single pharmacist who 
filled such a prescription, and does not identify a single state healthcare program that 
submitted a claim for reimbursement to the federal government.  The relators contend 
that their Complaint “contains factual allegations which reliably indicate that false claims 
were submitted to the Government.” We disagree.  The Complaint piles inference upon 
inference to suggest that Solvay’s marketing campaign influenced some unknown third 
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parties to file false claims.  We cannot conclude that the Complaint satisfies the 
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)… 
 
In Solvay, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the complaint of 
the relator is deficient under the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) that the party must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake.”
62 In the context of the FCA, this means the relator must be able to make specific 
factual allegations that identify the physicians, pharmacists, or health programs that were 
involved. The Court also made a less relator-friendly interpretation of the Act, adopting an 
interpretation of the FCA that leads to a more stringent pleading standard on both parts of the 
FCA, making it more difficult for private plaintiffs to successfully bring suit. In 31 U.S.C.S. § 
3729(a)(1), there is a "presentment clause" that imposes liability on any person who “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government…a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”
63 The 11th Circuit, on public 
policy grounds, required indication of an actual false claim with specific factual allegations to 
satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).
64 While §3729(a)(2) does not have a 
presentment requirement, the court, nevertheless, held that relators must show that the 
government paid a false claim to prove a violation of FCA. The rationale is that it is 
congressional intent to impose liability only when the false statements actually cause the 
government to pay amounts it does not owe.
65  
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This decision is a severe blow to the use of the FCA by private relators in enforcement of 
off-label marketing rules, because now they must have specific evidence—not merely an attempt 
to engage in off-label marketing, but an account of who wrote such prescriptions. Since most 
personal medical data is protected by HIPAA, relator claims under the FCA will likely be 
unsuccessful, absent monumentally obvious behavior or continued efforts to defraud the 
government through inducement of off-label prescription writing despite concerted investigation. 
Further adding to the uncertainty is United States ex rel Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech 
Products, decided by the First Circuit in August 2009, for which the Supreme Court also denied 
certiorari, on the same day as Solvay. On the issue of whether to impose a priori restrictions on 
the information that relators must have before filing a case, the Ortho holding is favorable to the 
relators, interpreting the “original source” standard of § 3730(e)(4)(B) to only require the relators 
to voluntarily provide the information to the government prior to filing of qui tam suit, as oppose 
to before public disclosure of the potential fraud.
66 However, the First Circuit’s discussion of 
circuit splits indicates a confusion of the law and a lack of uniformity between different 
jurisdictions that would be helped by a Supreme Court’s hearing of the case. In contrast to the 
more permissive First and Fourth Circuit, the relators face a much higher bar in making their 
case under FCA in the jurisdictions with more restrictive rules, such as the Ninth, Sixth, and D.C. 
circuits. The lack of a national standard for the use of FCA to regulate pharmaceutical promotion, 
a national activity, may result in inefficiency of enforcement and forum shopping, weakening the 
law’s effectiveness and reducing its fairness.  
To partially counter these recent court rulings that narrow the power of the False Claims 
Act, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) in 2009. The FERA 
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expanded the substantive liability sections of the FCA and increased the Government’s ability to 
investigate and engage in discovery of potential false claims before bring a lawsuit.
67 The 
amendments softened the impact of Solvay on relators’ ability to file suit by striking the 
“presentment clause” of § 3729(a)(1); the new provision imposes liability on anyone who 
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented a false claim,” without requiring that the claim be 
presented to an officer or employee of the U.S. government.
68 The new law also extends anti-
retaliation protection to whistleblowers, providing them with a safe harbor and preventing 
industry-wide employment-lockout, which occurred with relative frequency to previous 
whistleblowers.
69 
Recent developments of the law, splits between circuits, and the battle between the 
judiciary and legislature makes one wonder there is something intrinsic to the FCA that is 
causing the confusion. The FCA was enacted in 1863 with the “principal goal of stopping the 
massive frauds perpetrated by large [private] contractors during the Civil War.”
70 Although it has 
evolved over the past century-and-a-half, it is questionable whether the FCA is suited for 
addressing the problems of off-label marketing. 
The purpose of the FCA’s qui tam cause of action has been to allow insiders with specific 
information to come forward and pursue claims. This is in line with the legislative history of the 
FCA and its expansions which tried to find “the golden mean between adequate incentives for 
whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of 
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opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own.”
71 While 
the FCA has been very effective in attaining judgments for health care fraud – $14.3 billion since 
1986-2008 when the FCA was revived and expanded – qui tam suits on off-label pharmaceutical 
promotion comprise only a very small proportion of this. To put these totals in perspective, the 
Department of Justice estimates that enforcement by the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, a multi-
agency team of federal, state, and local investigators,
72 in the Miami area alone reduced medical 
billing by over $2 billion dollars. The problem of false billing by physicians and hospitals dwarfs 
all medical off-label marketing suits, which totaled $3 billion in the same period for the entire 
US.
73  
  Prominent qui tam suits are more typically like the case against Johnson and Johnson 
settled on the 15th of January, 2010:
74 
The United States alleges that, in order to induce Omnicare and its pharmacists to 
recommend J&J drugs, the company paid kickbacks to Omnicare in numerous ways. First, 
the complaint alleges that J&J entered into agreements with Omnicare by which Omnicare 
was entitled to increasing levels of rebates from Johnson & Johnson so long as Omnicare 
implemented specific programs to increase the prescriptions of J&J drugs. Second, the 
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complaint alleges that J&J paid Omnicare millions of dollars for "data," much of which 
Omnicare never provided. According to the complaint, the true purpose of these payments 
was to induce Omnicare to recommend J&J drugs. Third, the complaint alleges that J&J 
made various other substantial kickback payments to Omnicare, calling the payments 
"grants" and "educational funding," even though their true purpose was to induce Omnicare 
to recommend J&J drugs. 
This Johnson and Johnson case is the kind of case which a relator can bring, even if the 
government later joins the suit and collects the lion's share of the damages. It involves quid pro 
quo payments to influence prescribing decisions, regardless of FDA label. The case turned 
around specific payments and rebates, payments for services which was never provided, and 
false payments labeled grants and educational funding, in contrast to the complexity of Solvay 
and Ortho, which required access both to the marketing activities of pharmaceutical companies 
and the prescribing habits of physicians. The relators need to prove intent, action, and effect, 
which is virtually impossible for any single insider who is not at the executive level. As a result, 
while in an ordinary year tens of millions of dollars is paid to relators under FCA claims,
75 
almost none of this is for off-label marketing not involving kickbacks; instead the bulk is for 
fraudulent claims filed by doctors. 
  The numbers show that the FCA is effective primarily in dealing with criminal wrong-
doing involving false claims filed and kickbacks. The following table was compiled by the law 
firm of Fried Frank from DOJ Civil Division records, and shows a breakout of recoveries from 
healthcare fraud enforcement action between qui tam and non-qui tam suits. 
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Year  Actions  Recoveries 
  NQT  Qui Tam  NQT  Qui Tam DOJ  Relator Share  Total of All 
1987  12  3  11,361,826  0  0  11,361,826 
1988  8  5  2,182,675  355,000  88,750  2,537,675 
1989  20  16  350,460  5,099,661  50,000  5,450,121 
1990  27  11  10,327,500  903,158  119,474  11,230,658 
1991  22  12  8,670,735  5,420,000  861,401  14,090,735 
1992  29  15  9,821,640  2,192,478  446,648  12,014,118 
1993  22  38  12,523,165  151,760,404  22,946,101  164,283,569 
1994  43  76  381,470,015  6,520,815  1,185,597  387,990,830 
1995  27  87  96,290,779  85,681,789  14,803,782  181,972,568 
1996  20  179  63,059,873  51,576,698  9,374,568  114,636,571 
1997  49  274  351,440,027  579,079,581  58,872,855  930,519,608 
1998  35  275  40,107,920  258,638,736  47,822,301  298,746,656 
1999  28  315  38,000,792  408,128,379  45,492,385  446,129,171 
2000  36  211  208,899,015  725,011,203  115,759,246  933,910,218 
2001  35  177  435,849,179  900,260,345  147,318,543  1,336,109,524 
2002  24  194  74,567,427  961,248,757  154,289,403  1,035,816,184 
2003  26  219  536,834,879  1,312,296,030  284,670,601  1,849,130,909 
2004  28  275  34,816,447  475,370,142  97,434,278  510,186,589 
2005  34  271  204,821,548  912,927,980  122,673,758  1,117,749,528 
2006  18  223  1,050,520,714  1,241,774,802  166,735,688  2,292,295,516 
2007  24  202  465,052,993  1,065,800,181  155,129,755  1,530,853,174 
2008  60  228  150,808,253  966,568,225  183,528,337  1,117,376,478 
     2009  627  3,306  4,187,777,862  10,116,614,364  1,629,603,471  14,304,392,226   35   
This table dramatically overstates the share of qui tam recoveries, since non-qui tam judgments 
do not include the recovery to the Social Security or Medicare trust funds, and many non-qui tam 
suits are settled at the district level by the U.S. Attorney's office, not centrally by DOJ’s Civil 
Enforcement. Compared to the figures for non-qui tam judgments, the total for relators in off-
label marketing as a share of the above numbers comes to less than $100 million, the bulk from a 
few high profile cases.  
  FCA claims generally have to be pursued by the Department of Justice and are neither 
swift nor certain for drug marketing claims. While there is generally a two year lead time 
between suit and judgment, qui tam cases can involve off-labeling marketing that happened a 
decade ago, such as the recent DOJ settlement with Novartis over the marketing of a cystic 
fibrosis drug that began in 2001.
76 While there have been cases of corporate officers prosecuted 
for knowingly pursuing fraudulent billing activities, these are not associated with any of the large 
judgments mentioned earlier. This time-lag between activity and judgment opens the door to a 
cost-benefit analysis on the part of individuals employed in the industry, including executives 
and managers, in favor of engaging in off-label marketing: they might not be caught, and by the 
time the financial penalty occurs, even if it is a net negative for the corporation they work for, 
they might well have sold their own personal stake in the company, or moved on professionally. 
The FDA does not have the resources to mount long civil prosecutions by itself, as they take 
years, and therefore lack the individual deterrent effect in the case of marketing. 
 
A Welter of Jurisdictions 
  By making the Fraudulent Claims Act, with its focus on recovery of damages and law 
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suits the centerpiece of enforcement after warning letters, which, it must be underlined, have no 
legal force, and do not commit the agency to any legal action, another negative effect has been 
created: that of a proliferation of jurisdictions where drug marketing suits are brought, and the 
resulting range of law, which varies from Federal Circuit to Federal Circuit on key issues, and 
involves state as well as Federal law. Thus suits can be brought in state courts, any federal 
district court, or adjudicated before councils established under several acts that amend the 
FD&C. 
  The first possible venue is in state courts, similar to the regime contemplated in the 
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009,
77 which allows lawsuits to be originated in state courts under 
state commercial statutes. This method has the advantage of dispersing the workload of 
enforcement and having regionalization of judgment based on local community standards of 
practice and advertising. This is the standard procedure for malpractice today. But this is not 
completely assured because of the possibility that state proceedings will be pushed to Federal 
Court under diversity of jurisdiction under the Erie rule. Because manufacturers are localized in 
a few states, while potential plaintiffs are in all states, there is a good chance of diversity of 
jurisdiction. 
  However, its defects are severe: it defeats uniformity, it assures no particular level 
expertise, and no balancing of protection and access, and it undermines the Federal structure 
contemplated by congress, encourages under-marketing in strict jurisdictions, and over-
marketing in permissive ones, and places local and parochial state interests in the mix of 
decisions. Would a state court decide against a local drug maker, and in favor of one in another 
state?  
                                                 
77   Medical Device Safety Act, H.R. 1346, 111
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  The larger problem is that of the possible grounds for action, state courts cannot judge 
FD&C claim, and have varying statutes on False Claims Act for Medicare, based on the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005,
78 which sets standards for state False Claim Acts and recovery of 
amounts as the result of state action. The state is required to:  
•  Establish liability to the State for false or fraudulent claims described in the False 
Claims Act (FCA) with respect to any expenditures related to State Medicaid 
plans described in section 1903(a) of the Act; 
•  Contain provisions that are at least as effective in rewarding and facilitating qui 
tam actions for false or fraudulent claims as those described in the FCA; 
•  Contain a requirement for filing an action under seal for 60 days with review by 
the State Attorney General; 
•  Contain a civil penalty that is not less than the amount of the civil penalty 
authorized under the FCA. 
  
  As of May 2011 the following states have been reviewed by the Office of the Inspector 
General of HHS for compliance with these Federal Provisions: California. Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin.
79 
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79  Office of the Inspector General, State Flase Claims Act Reviews, 
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  Lanham Act
80 claims can be pursued in state courts, for example by having commercial 
codes which expressly enforce federal law, and therefore create another potential for lack of 
uniformity based on how each interprets enforcement. These state cases are often precluded by 
conflict with a more specific federal statute, see VP Racing Fuels, Inc. v. General Petroleum 
Corp., where claims under the Lanham Act were precluded based on a conflict with Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act.
 81 However, this is not a blanket preclusion; the specific claims must be 
evaluated, to see if there is a specific conflict. In Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean Spray 
Cranberries, Inc., the court ruled that the Lanham Act claims were not precluded by the 
FD&C.
82 
 
Summary  
  Against the complexity of the policy balancing act, of protecting the public's twin 
interests in having access to as many beneficial drugs as possible, while protecting patients from 
dangerous medications and useless expense, the legal regime of off-label marketing is inefficient, 
legally ineffective, and constitutionally suspect. The primary means of enforcement, an 
escalation from warning letters to civil and criminal suits, takes years to work through the 
system, and seems to have little over all effect on the practice of marketing drugs for uses which 
are dangerous or useless. The attempt to directly limit marketing has repeatedly been frustrated 
by the Central Hudson standard required for restrictions on commercial speech in a chain of 
cases starting with Washington Legal Foundation v Friedman,
83 and the subsidiary attempts 
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using the False Claims Act as a ground for private action have produce no high profile victories, 
and a string of decisions restricting the practical applicability of the FCA. 
  As a consequence, it is time to propose more sweeping changes to the legal regime 
associated with drug marketing. However a large part of the problem has been the framing of the 
legal issues as agency against marketing efforts and pharmaceutical corporations, rather than as a 
cooperative effort of public agency and private industry to maximize the total public good. To 
see how best to pursue this goal, it is useful to invoke concepts from economics, specifically the 
theory of games, to expand the quantity and improve the quality of information available to 
physicians, researchers, the government, and the consumers of pharmaceuticals. 
 
A New Legal Regime for Drug Marketing 
  The proposed new regime rests on three elements, all of them already present in embryo 
in the law. The first is a formalized multi-tier labeling system from the FDA, which would take 
the range of exceptions already present in practice and in the FDAMA and produce a single clear 
stepped system of labeling. The third is to expand the authority given by the Prescription Drug 
Marketing Act to allow the FDA to have enforcement powers that would be swift, sure, and 
effective in the presence of non-compliance by manufacturers. The purpose is to provide a better 
intermediate range of Agency responses between those needed in large violations and the smaller 
administrative actions in the case of minor disputes over the scope of the label. The first then, 
offers a series of carrots for compliance, and the second, a stick which will press drug companies 
to cooperate in good faith with the agency.  
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Standards of an Effective Legal Regime 
 
  The desire for regulatory uniformity is based on three considerations. The first comes 
from the regulatory chaos that would ensue if there were an unspecified number of local systems, 
including potentially one for each state, and possibly more if differences among localities are 
allowed. Since drug marketing is a national activity, pharmaceutical manufacturers would face a 
nightmare of local regulations, which they could violate simply by buying internet advertising or 
air time on a station that covers more than one jurisdiction in its broadcast area.  
  The challenge of navigating multiple state and local standards of marketing could at best 
induce “defensive marketing” where there is a convergence of adherence to the strictest 
standards when costs of tailoring of marketing outweighs the benefits gained from lower 
standards, and more likely result in regulation confusion and uncertainty.  Both of these 
outcomes drive up the costs of compliance without necessarily keeping physicians and patients 
better informed. Since the goal is to present the information on the drug truthfully and accurately, 
defensive marketing has the drawbacks of defensive labeling—misrepresentation, information 
overload, and marketing drought. In such “a race to the bottom” toward the most conservative 
marketing standard, the marketing is either going to be skewered toward narrowing presenting 
the label, excessively emphasize the negative effects, or alternatively give up marketing 
completely because the risk and liability and costs exceeds the benefits and profit. Nether of 
these effects would further the public good of informed physicians and patients.  
  The second consideration is the manifestly irregular level of enforcement. Such a system 
would create a lottery where by manufacturers are subject to civil litigation or enforcement in 
some jurisdictions and be spared in others, facing disproportionate fines or consequences. The   41   
companies would, here to fore, avoid doing business in areas of more stringent rules and 
enforcement or limit their marketing only to that which would be acceptable in the most 
restrictive sense. If there are 50 jurisdictions there is the potential not merely for differing 
standards, but contradictory ones. If federal regulations can be disregarded by lawmakers, 
officials, judges, and juries, there is the potential for eroding the confidence and authority of the 
entire federal scheme. It is clearly the objective of the Congresses that have passed and amended 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that there be a single national standard for the approval and 
manufacture of drugs, and this implies that there be a single and uniform flow of information.
84 
For example the way that Herrmann and Bownas have argued in their 2009 paper that the FDA 
label should be completely inadmissible as evidence for malpractice standard of care.
85 If the 
label provides no evidentiary weight, why should a manufacturer not push the envelope in 
promoting off-label uses? Indeed the uniformity of labeling that is part of the structure of FDA 
regulation almost requires that claims made on the basis of FDA approval be presented in a 
uniform manner. 
  This leads to the importance of the FDA as an expert agency, and one which is capable of 
balancing both potential harm and potential benefits. In a locality, particularly a jury trial, the 
individuals harmed are present as the plaintiffs, but the individuals whose lives have been saved 
or improved will not be present to rebut or balance the presentation of the harms alleged. By 
lodging the decision making process in an expert agency with national scope, the government 
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can argue both for the protection of the public from misleading or erroneous claims, and for the 
access of the public to the most current and complete information on treatment options.  
  This centralization has the further advantage that the true costs and benefits of a given 
regulatory regime can be monitored and measured, allowing manufacturers, policy makers, and 
the public to judge whether the regulatory regime is, in fact, effective and efficient at promoting 
the desired ends, and is, in fact, promoting the desired results. While centralization imposes 
further costs on the agency charged with maintaining the national system, it also allows the 
offsetting fees or other charges to be centralized as well, and tells Congress exactly how much it 
costs to enforce their legislation, and the Executive Branch how well its policy regime is 
faithfully executing the laws. 
  The next principle of a best solution is that marketing claims should be directed at telling 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. This means that it should discourage both 
manufactures from promoting misleading, unproven, or confusing claims, and conversely from 
engaging in defensive marketing which could frighten or confuse the public and physicians. 
While on balance the evidence indicates that presently there is an under-reporting of dangers and 
side effects, neither over, nor under reporting advance the public good. 
  Finally, since drug and device research and manufacture are for profit in a large majority 
of cases, the inability to market a product virtually assures that it will not be profitable. This 
could deter the research into treatments which might be subject to any number of claims, and 
thus deny the public access to treatments which have been judged safe and effective for their 
intended population, or new potential treatments in the future. This means that any procedural 
regime should be judged on its ability to protect the public from harm, and promote the public   43   
good. A treatment that a person does not receive because their physician did not know about it is 
worse than one which is not available at all. This is not only because of the human tragedy of 
needless death or suffering, but from the reality that the research and manufacture of drugs is 
largely composed of fixed costs, by reducing by one the number of beneficiaries, it increases the 
cost that must be apportioned on the remaining recipients of the drug. 
  The FDA recognizes that prescribing of drugs for unapproved uses is important in the 
exploration and expansion of medical knowledge. As Joseph, Deaton, Ehsan and Bonanno 
outline in "Enforcement Related to Off-Label Marketing and Use of Drugs and Devices: Where 
Have We Been and Where Are We Going," the government recognizes that medical evidence 
often moves faster than regulation, and explicitly allows physicians to act on sound judgment 
and evidence.
86 Medicare and Medicaid compensate for unapproved uses of drugs. These 
treatments form the basis of potential expansion of labeling, new uses for old drugs, and new 
categories of drugs. Without this empirical basis, the introduction of new applications would be 
hindered.  
  As noted earlier, the most difficult task for a manufacturer is distinguishing direct from 
indirect promotion for off-label uses, which are not permitted by FDA, as opposed to 
communicating about off-label uses in a strictly non-promotional and scientific context, which is 
permitted commercial speech. 
  Clarity is important, because it is essential for individuals to know, or be able to know, in 
advance, whether a particular action is legal or not. The current state of marketing enforcement 
of drug and device law fails to meet this most basic of fairness in law. 
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  Because unapproved uses represent the future state of the art, a legal regime should not 
throttle in the cradle potential life saving and life improving applications, and drug companies 
should feel confident that wonder drugs that have many potential applications will have the 
chance to prove their worth. Patients whose prognosis is poor have less to lose than those who 
are not in urgent danger, or facing chronic debilitation. In the present regime, it is very difficult 
to weigh efficacy against risk for patients. Marketing considerations should not interfere with the 
practice of medicine, or with the dissemination of legitimate medical experience and data on the 
efficacy and safety of already approved medications. 
   This differs in degree from the promotion of drugs for unapproved application, for 
example the use of anabolic steroids for athletic performance enhancement, or human growth 
hormone for cosmetic reasons. Where the exact line between life improving use, and high risk 
abuse is, cannot easily  
   In summary, uniformity, expertise and balance, veracity, and promotion of the public 
good both for protection and treatment provide a framework for reasoning towards a procedural 
regime for the enforcement of marketing regulations in the field of drugs and medical devices. 
  These principles follow from well established legal theory on the approval, regulation, 
and enforcement of drug and device law. For example the testimony of Peter Barton Hutt before 
Congress on the Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, contains virtually all of the principles in 
arguing against the decentralization of device liability.
87 The same principles apply to the 
marketing of drugs and devices because the same liability is involved for misapplication or 
misuse.  
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An Economic View of the Structure of Marketing and Labeling 
  One of the most important considerations in any legal proposal is asking how the regime 
will play out in actual practice. It is not enough to make statements out of ideological bias as to 
how a particular regime will operate in actual practice. In aid of analyzing the problems with the 
current regime, and with proposing a new one, some concepts from the Theory of Games are 
introduced here to give an analytical tool that can survive not only academic rigor, but practical 
application. 
  The Theory of Games is a formalism for examining decisions under different pressures of 
outcomes that rely upon information and the actions of other actors. Game theory models 
decisions when actors have choices, but their final outcome relies on the decisions of others. 
Game theory provided insights into, for example, why competitive actors could end up at the 
worst, rather than the best result, and how an actor with an advantage in information could 
produce worse results for that actor. The first one is exemplified by the famous Prisoner's 
Dilemma, and the second by work on "information asymmetry."  
  Game theory has been proposed as a mechanism for examining the law, in that it provides 
several compelling advantages. The first is that it relates to other disciplines, the second is that 
game theory forms can be described as fact patterns, and are thus open to legal reasoning, and 
third they offer a dramatic simplification of problems. In Game Theory and the Law, Baird, 
Gertner and Picker argue: 
Game theory, like all economic modeling, works by simplifying a given social situation 
and stepping back from the many details that are irrelevant to the problem at hand. The 
test of a model is whether it can hone our intuition by illuminating the basic forces that 
are at work, but not plainly visible when we look at an actual case in all its detail. The   46   
spirit of the enterprise is to write down the game with the fewest elements that captures 
the essence of the problem.
88  
  
But most importantly they provide a way to counter immediate judgments and biases, for 
example in “Law and Game Theory," Eric Rasmusen describes one paper this way: 
The last section of this volume consists of three articles about the behavior of courts. The 
first article, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation” (George Priest and Benjamin 
Klein, The Journal of Legal Studies, 1984), is famous for destroying the common-sense– 
but false– idea that if defendants win most of the cases in a court, that court is pro-
defendant. This is false because what may be happening is that the court is so pro-
plaintiff that only the defendants with extraordinarily strong evidence on their side bring 
their suits to trial, or because the majority of cases filed settle in favor of the plaintiff but 
the few that reach trial are a special set which happens to include mostly cases that the 
defendant will win.
89  
  
  In game theory, the possibilities are represented by a table, with the choices available to 
each player presented as columns or rows. The intersection of two choices is found by looking 
across the row representing one player's choice, and finding the intersection of the row that 
represents the other player's choice. The consequences for each player are there. Games can have 
results that are known in advance, or not, they can be fixed, or variable. What is important is the 
narrative of choices can be turned into a fact pattern, and the results of that fact pattern 
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extrapolated. 
  Consider, for example, two parties to a law suit, each party has different positions and 
interests, as well as differing abilities to pursue a suit. They can settle their differences, or take 
them through the trial process. If both actors cooperate, they can come to a settlement which is 
most beneficial to both; however, either party can, assuming a sufficiently strong case and 
enough resources, force a trial. This produces a table with probable outcomes, and allows each 
party to make a rational decision whether their best personal outcome is settlement or trial; 
however, this might not produce the highest expected return for both. Since policy is interested in 
maximizing the probable outcome of encounters with the law, and has the ability to set the 
probable outcomes, policy can alter the very terrain of the decision, for example, by forcing 
discovery, so that no party has a sufficient information advantage to deny the other a rational 
choice, and so that no party fears not having information, and so choosing to go to trial from fear 
that the other party is hiding crucial details; nor should any party fear to exercise their legal 
rights in pursuit of their interests. 
  The tools from economics that this paper will rely upon come then, from 70 years of 
development of game theory and economics. The first is two forms of game, the Prisoner's 
Dilemma and the related form, the Stag Hunt. These are kinds of "games" where two more 
participants are faced with a decision to cooperate, or betray, each other, and there are different 
expected results in each case. The second is the concept of an information asymmetrical "death 
spiral," outlined by Akerlof,
90 where the presence of bad goods in a market leads to a gradual 
driving out of better goods. 
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  The classic explanation of the Prisoner's Dilemma
91 is, in fact, phrased as a legal one: two 
men are caught fleeing the scene of a robbery; the police present both with a series of 
possibilities. The first is if both maintain their innocence, then they will both be sentenced to a 
year in prison. If one talks, then that one will go free; the other will serve 7 years. If both talk, 
then both will serve 5 years. Each one reasons as follows: if the other does not talk, then either I 
will serve one year for not talking, or none for talking, so I should talk, and if the other talks, 
then I will either serve 7 years if I do not talk, or 5 if I do. That means, either way, I am better off 
talking than not talking, leading to both talk, and both go to prison for 5 years, which is the worst 
total outcome, because a total of 10 years are served, as opposed to 2 or 7. The ironies to this are 
that, presuming both are guilty, then the society wants there to be a dilemma, but the same 
reasoning applies even if one is innocent.  
  Economic theory provides a variety of answers to the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the case 
where the outcomes cannot be changed, these include signaling or other penalties, for example, a 
promise to the other to seek revenge later if the other rats. However, if the outcomes can be 
changed, by, for example the law, then it is possible to change the form of the game from one 
where the best choice is to betray, to forms where the best choice is to cooperate. One of these 
cooperation friendly forms is the Stag Hunt. 
  A Stag Hunt is a similar either or decision, but instead, two hunters have a choice, both 
can hunt a stag, which is worth 7 days of food to both if the both hunt for a stag, or one can hunt 
rabbits alone, which is worth 2 days of food if the other hunts a stag, but only 1 if both hunt 
rabbits. In this case, cooperating is always better than not cooperating, so both cooperate.  
  The other objective is to promote what is called “robust” cooperation, rather than 
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“fragile” cooperation. In economics “fragile” defines a situation where relatively small changes 
in the distribution of strategies, preferences, or conditions create a very large change in results, 
whereas robust describes the opposite: one where small changes to conditions lead to small 
changes in results.
92 In Brown and Vincent's 2008 paper, they explore what conditions lead to 
stable cooperation in different games. They conclude that the key criterion is the uncertainty of 
maximum rewards and penalties.
93 Where these are known, actors come to robust cooperative 
arrangements, and where they are not, cooperative arrangements become unstable. Therefore, 
legal arrangements aimed at robust cooperation, should examine those cases where either 
rewards or penalties are prone increase without easily understood limits. The thrust of their 
argument is that known rewards create incentives to violate the norms of the group to attain 
them, and known penalties are simply computed in a cost-benefit way based on the potential 
known penalties, however, in the face of uncertainty and potential run-a-way consequences, self-
interest leads to a collective understanding to limit potential damage. 
  This fits in with the well known effect called the "market for lemons." Consider a used 
car market, goes Akerloff's paper,
94 and assume there are two kinds of cars: lemons and good 
cars, and the sellers know which is which, but buyers do not. The sellers reason "if I offer a good 
car, the best I can do is sell it at the good car price, and I might get the bad car price, but if I offer 
the bad car, the worst that can happen is that I get the bad car price, and I might make the good 
car price." The buyers reason the same way, and offer only the bad car price. This means that the 
good cars will not be offered for sale as long as there are bad cars. A "death spiral" occurs when 
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each sale of a bad car convinces buyers that only bad cars are for sale and each sale of a good car 
at the bad car price convinces sellers it is not worth offering a good car for sale in this market. 
Good cars pile up, and so command a lower price even if the buyer offers a good car. The irony 
of the "market for lemons" is that the seller has an advantage in information, but is penalized for 
that advantage.  
  The challenge is to turn a Prisoner's Dilemma into a cooperative pattern, and to establish 
a robust cooperative pattern, which is not prone to break down precisely when dealing with the 
most consequential cases. To do this is to require diagnosing what the original problem was. It 
was not FDA administrative practice, or insufficiency of congressionally mandated specifics of 
the details of commerce, but instead the very design of a labeling scheme which has insufficient 
gradations, high barriers to entry of new uses, and a focus on the wrong part of pharmaceutical 
marketing for FDA enforcement. Thus, despite almost a quarter century of tinkering, Congress 
has failed to solve the problem, because the basic approach was one of attempting to micro-
manage the FDA, and have the FDA micro-manage the industry. Another large omnibus reform 
is likely to run into the same problems as previous attempts: the first amendment law is not 
friendly to Congress restricting speech which is not fraudulent and is in pursuit of a lawful end, 
courts are not friendly to private entities bringing complex suits under the FCA, an act which is 
only tangential to the question, nor do are they involved in ordinary cases in telling companies 
what not to do to restrain abuses in marketing.  
Proposed Regulatory Scheme: Tiered Drug Labeling 
  The fact that there are insufficient gradations to labeling is widely recognized.
95 What is 
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required is to expand information by codifying the welter of exceptions, approval extensions, and 
conditions into a clearly delineated scheme, and attaching specific benefits to each labeling step, 
so that companies will have an incentive to focus on legitimate research intended to expand the 
label of the drug in question, or raise the level. 
  The tiered-labeling structure for marketed drugs should have several broad levels, with 
ability to incorporate particular additional information within each level, and is concise, clear, 
and code-able, to avoid information overload on one hand, and accurately characterize the level 
of evidence on the other. The vertical distance between each level will need to be set at intervals 
that will incentive the companies to conduct clinical research to generate more information on 
the drug’s safety and efficacy. In a sense, the tiered system provides stepping stones over the gulf 
between the extremes of approval and non-approval, with the incentives to the pharmaceutical 
company for clinical testing more closely aligned with overall benefits of the drug, including 
both the public good of medical benefits and the private good of higher profits and expanded 
market. The company efforts will be redirected from hoping to find most effective, yet discrete 
way of engaging off-labeling marketing to productive R&D that would provide physicians, 
patients, and regulators with more information on the drug.  
  The proposed framework is to have several levels of FDA investigation and certification 
available, with specific benefits and restrictions for each, for drugs with at least one approved 
indication. Each level will be coded by color on the label: for instance, Approved would be 
Green, Reviewed would be Yellow, Developmental would be Orange, and Experimental would 
be Red. Unproven uses would be a kind of reverse labeling: for those cases where there is 
evidence that the medication should not be used in the target population, or for the particular   52   
condition, as such it would be related to the present black label warnings. Uses that are 
“unapproved” in the tiered system will also alerts physicians and payors that level of clinical 
evidence is dubious or anecdotal at best, which will in turn encourage company to seek 
recognition of at least one of the intermediate levels if they intend to expand use of the drug 
within that particular disease area..  
  There will, however, still be a significant difference between the intermediate levels of 
labeling, and the approved status, so that the tiered system does not discourage pharmaceutical 
companies from seeking approval. Intermediate levels do not grant any additional market 
exclusivity, which is often the single greatest driver of companies seeking approvals for 
subsequent indications. While each higher level indicates stronger clinical evidence to support 
the drug’s use for an unapproved indication, they do not provide the same product liability 
preemption shield of a full approval, which though no longer an invincible defense since Wyeth v. 
Levine,
96 still has significant force when the specific event is clearly warned in the label. The 
reduced liability protection also would be apply to physicians in malpractice litigation, where 
intermediate levels will not receive the same level of deference in establishing the standard of 
care as a fully approved label. Perhaps, the differentiation that most directly impacts the 
product’s profitability is the formulary status of the drug: both private payor and 
Medicare/Medicaid would take into consideration the levels as a proxy for strength of clinical 
evidence when making that decision.  
  Reviewed uses are those which are similar to the common off-label practices which 
physicians routinely employ, for example, using a medication for a similar patient population 
(e.g., pediatrics) or condition (e.g., pathogenesis pathway). However, there are important safety 
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implications for reviewed versus approved drugs. One of these would be to have a lower bar for 
black box warnings on delivery, dosage, and efficacy. In these cases the FDA would do as the 
label states: act as an honest broker, reviewing not only the pharmaceutical company's studies, 
but those from the field as well. In this way, the FDA could be guided by existing evidence based 
practice, and disseminate it as well. This would also dramatically reduce the need for off-label 
dissemination of studies and other cherry picking of information. The advantages that would 
accrue from being FDA reviewed would be a presumption against misbranding claims, and the 
ability to introduce the label as proof of compliance and a defense in medical malpractice. 
  Developmental indications are those for which there has been approval of the drug in a 
major foreign jurisdiction, such as the European Union or Japan, or for which there is clinical 
evidence for efficacy, without substantial evidence of increased risk. The purpose of the 
developmental indication would be to inform physicians of practice or research that indicates 
that there is substantial basis to use the drug for the indication, but that the data is still 
provisional, at least in the United States. Having this level will also encourage communication 
and share of information between the three major Drug approval agencies of the developed 
world, which would bring positive externalities (e.g., efficiency) to both the agencies and 
industry. 
  Experimental indications cover the cases of terminal patients, or those with extremely 
poor prognosis in general, who are seeking whatever glimmer of hope the medical profession 
offers. These would be restricted to target populations without alternative treatments, or for those 
whose alternative treatments do not offer a significant improvement to prognosis. The 
experimental rating will provide patients without alternatives with the option of trying drugs that   54   
have reach a FDA-determined threshold level of safety and efficiency, and where the potential 
for benefits outweighing the risk. The tiered labeling scheme can be elaborated with several 
additional metrics that enhances its informativeness. These additional metrics will be coded and 
displayed next to the colored dot of the tiered levels, displayed in a clear and obvious manner, 
perhaps bolded in a green or blue box to both draw attention and prevent confusion with a black 
box warning. One such metric is the route of delivery, which as the facts of Wyeth suggested, a 
compound perfectly safe in one formulation can harbor significant risks in another.
97 Another to 
consider is a battery of basic patient information, such as gender, race, and comorbidities, for a 
population that is consider most beneficial as determined by the clinical trials. This follows the 
FDA’s trend of granting narrow indications more frequently and gives the Agency an additional 
tool to specify the patient population that would most likely to benefit. Defining patient 
populations narrowly also has the benefit of encouraging more clinical studies, as pharmaceutical 
companies can only claim as much as they tested, and limiting the potential for abuse of cherry-
picking patient sub-groups.  
  The new label can also have board indicators of safety and efficacy that might not be 
linked to a particular level, but signals to physicians and payors the strength of the evidence and 
the level of risk. Many of these indicators, such as REMS and Phase-IV study requirements, are 
already part of the FDA’s post-marketing regulatory scheme and would be easy to incorporate 
into the new system. Others, for instance the recommendation for prior authorization of 
compounds with lower levels of evidence by private payors and Medicare/Medicaid, are novel 
mechanisms the Agency may employ to increase the regulatory effectiveness of the scheme. As 
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long as the Agency does not cross the line of regulating the practice of medicine, the Agency 
may make recommendation to the payors, since the approved label is already functioning in that 
capacity. 
  The intent is to communicate to physicians and patients that a drug, while not having 
gone through the full approval process, still has sufficient evidence to warrant use in appropriate 
courses of treatment. By creating a greater range of gradations, it removes the current haze of 
what is permissible off-label marketing, because, in this system, off-label really would mean off-
label: prescribed by the physician solely on his own judgment. 
 
Label      Requirement 
 
Approved  Present regime, including safety trials and efficacy 
Reviewed  Proof that the drug is the standard of care, backed by both empirical and 
clinical evidence independently gathered. 
Developmental  Certified by the EU, or with substantial independent clinical evidence of 
efficacy and safety.  
Experimental  Clinical evidence of efficacy 
Warning  Substantial evidence that the medication is either ineffective, or unsafe for 
the particular indication. 
 
  This turns the present Prisoner's Dilemma of almost all or nothing approval, into a 
cooperative Stag Hunt, in that the agency is no longer faced with opening the gates entirely to the 
use of a drug for a particular indication, and the pharmaceutical company has the ability to   56   
market indications where there is independent evidence that the drug is the standard of care 
based on clinical evidence. However, such a system would require that the FDA both have a 
greater reach, to more rapidly withdraw medications from the marketplace when there is 
indication of potential harm, and a venue with sufficient expertise to adjudicate the potentially 
knotty questions of level of approval.  
  How this happens may seem paradoxical. In the present system the agency's best 
approach for itself is to prevent approvals, or hold them to a high bar, to prevent high profile 
failures. An individual drug company's best strategy, given the high bar, is to pursue drugs which 
have as many hard to pin down off-label uses as possible, since these are the least likely to be 
identifiable in the case of liability, and those that are most over-prescribed. The least public 
benefit results: drugs are not approved, and companies as a group will tend to seek drugs in 
disease areas, such as pain management and psychiatry, since these are the most difficult to 
differentiate effective from ineffective, and to seek “niche busters” which are prescribed, as in 
the case of GERD, for anyone who is symptomatic, rather than based on evidence of efficacy. 
These are, then, the least useful indications. The triage of the company then is neither to seek 
approval for indications that will work, since these will happen in any event, nor for those that 
are obviously dangerous, but only for those indications which medical science would be unlikely 
to accept without marketing, instead of seeking approval where there are clear voids, since they 
know that if a medical treatment is efficacious, once approved, it will be adopted anyways as a 
standard of care over time with only minimal input, and it will be hard to dislodge if later 
research calls it into question. 
  As the example of pediatric GERD shows, there can be the FDA label, which does not   57   
match professional guidelines, which does not match clinical practice and what is shown to be 
effective when studied; none of the sources of authority agrees with each other. The purpose of 
expanding the FDA's role as a broker of information is to guide more physicians not only to best 
practices, but to spur constant improvement on best practices. In the GERD example, the APA 
guidelines would have formed the basis of an FDA Reviewed label, meaning that companies 
could market this without fear of accusations of misbranding or "off-label" marketing, and the 
study on clinical results could have been used as the basis for an application of an 
"Experimental" label with a follow up study. Conversely, these studies would be designed to 
separate the 25% of the patient population who would show improvement, from the others, who 
were either not helped, or were harmed, by the present usual course of treatment. 
  The second two pieces of the proposed regime are designed to shift enforcement efforts 
away from adversarial and long suits, and towards cooperative engagement, but backed by swift 
and sure inducements to comply. They deal with a problem implicitly described above, but which 
again is easier to describe as a game theory pattern. One of the important distinctions in game 
theory is between single games, where actors have the incentive to maximize a single play, or 
conversely minimize loss, to games where there is an incentive to seek a stability, the basic form 
of which is called a Nash Equilibrium.
98 For most drugs, the reason that warning letters and other 
signs of FDA displeasure are sufficient to induce compliance, because the FDA and the company 
are involved in a repeated game, the Nash equilibrium strategy is to treat the other side as it has 
treated you, a strategy of a family known as "Tit for Tat" strategies, where the opening move is to 
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trust, and then respond with the other side's most recent move.
99 
  However, a blockbuster drug is different. A single such drug can make the careers of the 
individuals creating it, and the revenues for these drugs are so large, that even if there is a billion 
dollar penalty waiting, the incremental revenues will more than pay that fine. Also, larger 
pharmaceutical firms that produce most of the blockbuster drugs have a regulatory advantage, 
because they are more likely to be high volume New Drug Application (NDA) filers and early 
market entrants due to their abundant resources and experience navigating FDA’s approval 
process, both factors shown to lead to regulatory protectionism.
100 Thus, the maker of a drug that 
has the potential to be a blockbuster drug has every reason to attempt to betray the system, and 
wait for the FDA to catch up. In this tiered labeling model, instead of tit for tat producing minor 
negative steps of betrayal, it will produce “rabbit hunting” of small advantages. The public is 
better off, even if nothing else changes.  
  There is then a series of carrots, to go with the greater use of sticks. These sticks should 
be seen in the context of the more nuanced labeling system proposed, namely that there will be a 
broader ranges of labels, and a broader range of marketing within these tiers. So long as the 
broader indication is both labeled clearly in each section as the header, with the color coding, and 
if needed a black box warning on administering the drug for the sub-approval levels of labeling, 
there is no reason for prior restraint, and no reason to have regulations or restrictions, such as the 
"unsolicited request" rule, which invite abuse. The Agency will have less hesitation in exacting 
penalties, since they will have a more nuanced range of responses in moving labeling, and can 
immediately respond to questionable marketing by updating the label to warn against the use. 
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Physicians, and payors, will have the ability to enforce the label through the normal mechanism 
of their gatekeeping powers. 
  The unexpected result, then, is that the way to turn the approval “game” into a Stag Hunt 
is to create rabbits. Remember that the choices in a Stag Hunt are cooperate for greater good, or 
not cooperate for lesser good, and if both fail to cooperate, for the least good for both. By 
creating tiers that can be pursued more or less independently by both players, the Agency can 
promote the public good without reference to the companies, and the companies can, by 
incremental stages, promote medically valid uses of their products. By creating rabbits, the 
preconditions for a robust game are created: each side knows that if the other stops cooperating, 
it can pursue independent good. Instead of attacking off-label marketing, the Agency will be able 
to set a path towards an indication being valid; instead of seeking to approve medicines of hard 
to prove disutility, it will have ways of expanding utility. Third party beneficiaries can also 
promote expansion of indication, which the Agency could encourage, by extending liability 
umbrellas over these indications. 
  The key would be to reframe the guidelines as "voluntary" but place substantial 
restrictions on those companies who abused them, as well as offer a safe harbor for those that 
comply. In addition to being able to force products to include information as part of the label, the 
FDA is free to restrict the distribution of medications. This would allow the agency to press 
much farther in its guidelines. There is no First Amendment issue, if companies agree to 
restrictions in return for concrete advantages. 
  The virtues of this system are obvious: it creates incentives to provide information, rather 
than attempt to manufacture it by buying professional recommendations and journal articles,   60   
since the very process of moving from journal to marketing would be one which the Agency 
would have oversight of. The practice of paying specialists, who then make recommendations, 
undermines the confidence in the system. For example, it has recently been reported that the 
doctors who made recommendations to stockpile anti-virals in response to H1N1 and Swine Flu, 
had a fiduciary relationship with the manufacturers of these medications.
101  
  The present labeling is used to make judgments on malpractice and on coverage under 
insurance. However, because of the lack of granularity of the licensing system, and the lack of a 
clear congressional scheme to make labeling fill these functions, courts have often deemed off-
label neither to be an indication of malpractice, nor grounds to deny coverage. In the regime 
proposed, the labeling system would possess this granularity, and suits could with greater 
confidence use the specific use against the labeled indication in making these judgments. The 
Agency could go farther and make particular indications recommended for "prior approval" by 
insurers. 
  The concerns this scheme raises are the application of the Central Hudson doctrine, the 
potential of opportunistic law suits, and the potential expense. Each of these concerns is squarely 
addressed by the regime proposed. It avoids direct confrontation with Central Hudson, relying 
primarily for enforcement on the FDA's congressional mandate to regulate the interstate 
commerce of pharmaceuticals. It proposes a theory of damages for private enforcement which is 
directly linked to material damages caused by improper marketing based on an interest created 
by holding a license, which would prevent standing from the vast majority of opportunistic suits. 
Finally the cost to the companies can easily be regained, since the sub-approvals could be 
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immensely profitable, and reduces, rather than increases, their risks.  
  The proposed labeling scheme avoids the problem of directly confronting Central 
Hudson, since distribution is firmly within the Interstate Commerce Clause.
102 The First 
Amendment issue is well known to those who follow drug marketing, and the composition of the 
successive majorities on the Supreme Court holds out little hope for those that hope for a 
different line of reasoning to be applied, because it has not been the dynamic of a static block of 
justices narrowly ruling against the government, but of a broad consensus on the court that 
commercial speech is protected against blanket bans and prior restraint by a well understood and 
generation old test. The underlying mechanism of effective enforcement is the nature of FDA 
approval as a license to introduce into Interstate Commerce. Licenses can be subject to additional 
conditions, no provision in the FD&C as amended prevents additional restrictions on FDA 
Approval, and the agency could codify adherence to marketing practice as part of the terms of 
that license, just as disclosure is part of the terms of the patent process, and compulsory 
registration is part of the copyright process. While this does not apply to already approved 
medications, it could apply to future approvals. 
  Moreover, it would strengthen the Agency's position against future Central Hudson 
challenges, because it would cut to the standards that the court has applied in rejecting previous 
restrictions: there would be greater consistency in the government's scheme, it would not have a 
welter of exceptions, the government would be shown to be enforcing the underlying state 
interest, the restrictions would not be prior restraint, and the information provided would be at 
least potentially misleading. It would dispense with complex and unenforceable sets of 
guidelines. 
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  Under the theory of damages presented in this paper, namely that sales of an improperly 
marketed drug impinge on the just expectations of complying with the license of FDA Approval, 
which qualifies as detrimental reliance, suits for improper marketing would have standing 
limited to those who can show damages. While this would open the door to class action suits on 
the part of patients, the class would have to show that but for the marketing, they would not have 
received the drug, which since the drug companies do not actually write the prescriptions, would 
be a difficult standard to meet. Instead the most common occurrence would be the ability of 
industry to enforce its own existing guidelines, by showing damages that occurred because of 
improper marketing. In this case a company would not have to show that a specific sale caused 
the damages, but merely that some part of the aggregate did. 
 
Meeting Standards of Effective Regulation 
  A tiered-labeling system provides all of the benefits of an efficient centralized regulatory 
scheme and an effective legal regime: uniformity, clarity, expertise, balance, and veracity. By 
having a system that predominately pulls with carrots, rather than pushes with sticks, but back-
stopped with very powerful sticks (e.g., Medicare death penalty), the system generates voluntary 
incentives to engage in a cooperative Stag Hunt. The private entities will work closely with the 
government regulators to advance the public good, because it will also be in the best interest of 
the private party. The uniform flow of information to physicians through these clear and truthful 
indications of a drug’s clinical profile, assured by the rigorous, comprehensive, unbiased expert 
review by the FDA, could improve the quality medical care, reduce medical errors, and avoid 
unnecessary healthcare spending.   63   
Uniformity 
  The uniform national standard avoids the inconsistency, complication, and confusion of 
having multiple state and local standards, prevents of “the race to the bottom” of defensive 
marketing and information overload. The new labeling scheme will be standardized nationally, 
so a patient from Nevada can show his medication list to his new physician in New York, who 
will be working with the same label that is communicating the same information as his Nevada 
physician did. With a uniform label, the physicians and the patient are all on the same page and 
collaborate with each without information barriers, without the need to consult different labels 
with local idiosyncrasies, and without the overly detailed label conforming to the most 
conservative standard.  
  While the state-law-based tort system, as reaffirmed by Wyeth, will still be in effect, a 
centrally administrated labeling system reduces any potential administrative costs of regulating 
different label should the state chose to do so, and the transactional costs of medical 
professionals trying to understand and adhere to different locality labels. Having a single 
clearinghouse for drug labeling will also ensure that the new system is closely integrated into the 
current regulatory scheme. Therefore, the tiered label has the virtue of uniformity: a system that 
is both practical and cost effective. 
 
Expertise 
  Closely connected to and setting the foundation for uniformity is the fact that the FDA, 
the foremost expert on drug regulation, will administer the program. Having both the science and 
medical expertise from regular approvals and a century-long history of regulating drug labeling,   64   
the Agency is well equipped, perhaps with additional resources, from an institutional standpoint 
to carry out the task and ensure consistency with the approval labeling system. The regulatory 
and legal experience of agency with pharmaceutical marketing, and the working relationship 
with industry, will be useful in making sure that rules are properly followed and the system is not 
abused. The new labeling system’s success rests on its accuracy, which the FDA’s technical and 
regulatory expertise will more than adequately provide for. 
 
Veracity 
  One of the main purposes of the tiered labeling system is to accurately reflect the realities 
of medical practice and pharmaceutical use: the truth is physicians will always be prescribing 
drugs off-label. The gradations of the label match the nuance of our understanding of the drug’s 
clinical effect. Many factors play into the amount of clinical research of a drug receives and the 
developmental status on an indication. The intermediate levels are both stepping stones toward 
full approval, and its exclusive benefits, and a label that truthfully indicates the drug’s efficacy 
and safety. Additionally, physicians will be on-notice of drugs that are truly unapproved, without 
any of the intermediated designation. 
  Rather than engaging in prior restraint to try to eliminate off-label marketing, the system 
refocuses the efforts of pharmaceutical companies on conducting clinical research to find out 
more information on these yet-to-be approved indications. The pharmaceutical company, instead 
of being agents in crime of promoting off-label prescribing that is useless or even harmful to the 
patient, will be directed to uncover the drug’s real clinical value. More informed medical 
decisions by physicians will undoubtedly improve patient care.    65   
Clarity 
  Improperly communicated information can be worse than the lack of information. Clarity 
is a major focus of the proposed system: the physicians and patients will not benefit much from 
quality discussed above, unless the format is one that is easy to understand and quickly 
accessible. The proposed system achieves clarity on both its design with intuitive levels and its 
presentation with color-coded summary box. The goal is to allow the physician to understand the 
system through a quick study and with the aid of nothing larger than a post card, and to access 
the information on the individual labels rapidly by glancing at the color coding. This innovation 
is superior to the current system where indications, clinical results, dosages are hidden within 
dense text and located in different parts of the label. The summary box will have the same 
prominence as a block box warning, except that the information it communicates in far more 
comprehensive and balanced.  
 
Balance 
  Ultimately, the proposed tiered labeling system is a critique of and a solution to the 
inability of current regulatory scheme to distinguish those off-label uses that are beneficial from 
those that are not. While part of the problem is the paradoxical hands-tied set-up of regulating 
off-label marketing without the authority to influence off-label use, a black and white labeling 
system with only the two levels of approval and non-approval does not have enough nuances to 
capture the information spectrum of clinical status. By providing a few shades of gray, the tiered 
label is not only a closer match to the reality, but also more importantly, presents a balanced view 
that advances of the public good of informed physicians and better quality healthcare for   66   
patients.  
  The balanced approach is also fairer to the drug manufacturers, in that their efforts in 
advancing clinical understanding of the drugs, albeit not on the level of a full approval, will be 
reward and encouraged in a systemic manner under the supervision of the FDA. The current 
abuses of the system, ranging from blatant off-label marketing to fraudulent journal articles, will 
be greatly reduced when there are legal ways to improve the label without undergoing the full 
investment of approval. Therefore, the Prisoner’s Dilemma will turn into a Stag Hunt for benefit 
of the public. 
 
Additional Benefits 
  It is important to note several consequences that this approach does not promote. One is 
bounty hunting by outside or tangentially involved parties. The interest is in the license that the 
FDA issues, and therefore those who do not have an expectation of legal rights under such a 
license are not given any more grounds for action than present. The creation of rights often leads 
to those who attempt to purchase those rights and expand them, as is seen by "patent trolling," or 
the case of relator suits not based on original information. Under this system, the party that is 
damaged by an abuse of a license, and thus entitled to damages, is one who has a similar license 
and an expectation of its enforcement, or is a gatekeeper relying on the information provided. 
Patients, in the abstract, can already sue for malpractice if harmed, and under this theory of the 
license, absent that provable damage, would not gain additional cause of action. 
  Another important pitfall avoided is focusing on the process as adversarial. While 
enforcement mechanisms, from very broad to very specific, are contemplated here, the most   67   
important pillar of the system is giving companies greater incentive to reveal positive 
information about their products, rather than on relators exposing allegedly negative information. 
The example of the study of GERD, acid reflux, is here important. The primary public interest is 
in the patients getting the best treatment, and bringing all parties that are part of the system into 
alignment to accomplish this. Enhancement, not enforcement, is promoted. 
  The third pitfall that is avoided is the pitfall of the combination of institutional timidity 
much of the time, combined with an incentive to institutional excess in spectacular cases. 
Companies with out clear financial incentive place drugs narrowly, only to "go for broke" with 
the blockbusters. The FDA has every incentive to launch high profile cases, but little incentive to 
improve the indication of smaller drugs. Congress has every incentive to step in at a moment of 
perceived crisis, and throw hundreds of pages of legislation forward, disregarding that key 
provisions are unlikely to survive established and broadly supported constitutional tests, but far 
less to provide a fair playing field. 
 
Conclusion 
  In summary, the present regime for the regulation of off-label marketing does not 
promote the public's twin interests of availability and information. It does not improve access 
universally, with variability in how persuaded the physician is by the promotion and how payors 
handle the off-label status.  It has clouded, rather than clarified information, by either skewing 
information in favor of the off-label use, or cloaking it in disrepute because of its off-label status. 
At the root of this is an adversarial set of systems which give participants strong incentives to 
risk adverse legal consequences, or to fail to take far smaller risks for far more sustainable   68   
rewards, both motivated by institutional or personal gain. The proposed mechanism, by creating 
a tiered labeling system linked to clinical evidence, forces greater cooperation and increases 
incentives for research, in a design aimed at the public good, rather than at private profits and 
public recoveries in high profile cases. The systems will reduce current state of confusion, where 
there is little distinction between pharmaceutical sponsored biased literature and objective 
clinical research, and increased granularity provides greater clarity to physicians on the actual 
level of clinical evidence. More importantly, the tiered labeling system, unlike other blunt 
instruments of off-label enforcement, preserves the beneficial off-label prescribing, while 
eliminating those that are abusive and needlessly costing the public. 